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DISSOLVING  A  PARTNERSHIP  EFFICIENTLY 
BY  PETER  CRAMTON,  ROBERT  GIBBONS,  AND  PAUL  KLEMPERERI 
Several partners  jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has 
a valuation  for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently 
from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible 
and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms,  and give  a simple  necessary  and 
sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A 
bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite 
incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved 
ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with 
Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved  when the 
asset is owned by a single party. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
WHEN  A  PARTNERSHIP  IS TO BE DISSOLVED,  who  should  buy  out  his  associates 
and at what price? When municipalities jointly need a hazardous-waste dump, 
which town should provide the site and how much should it be compensated by 
the others? When husband and wife divorce, or children divide an estate, who 
should keep the family house or farm, and how much should the others be paid? 
We consider partnerships in which each player i is endowed  with a share r, 
of  a good  to be traded, and specific capital or other transaction costs make it 
inefficient to sell the good  on the market and split the proceeds.2 We look  for 
procedures that allocate  the  good  ex  post  efficiently while  satisfying  interim 
individual rationality. Unlike Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)-who  show that 
no  procedure can yield  both  properties in  two-player bargaining games  with 
uncertainty (r1  = 1 and r2= 0)-we  show that the distributed ownership found in 
a partnership often makes the two compatible. For the case of n players whose 
valuations are independently drawn from an arbitrary distribution, we derive a 
simple condition that is necessary and sufficient for efficient, individually-rational 
dissolution, and we introduce a simple bidding game that will accomplish such 
dissolution whenever it can be achieved as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in some 
extensive-form game. 
The application  that inspired our analysis was the  Federal Communication 
Commission's allocation of licenses for cellular-telephone franchises. After clos- 
ing the list of applicants, the FCC proposed to make the final allocation  using 
l This project was begun at Stanford University and financially supported by the Sloan Foundation, 
the National Science Foundation, and the Center for Economic Policy Research. We are grateful to 
David Gold for posing the problem and encouraging its analysis, and to Roger Guesnerie, Christopher 
Harris, David  Kreps, Robert Wilson, and two referees for helpful suggestions. 
2 See  van  Damme  (1985)  for a  related study of  fair division  when  each  player has  an  equal 
ownership share. 
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a simple lottery. Prior  to the lottery each applicant has an equal chance of winning, 
and so  can be thought of  as owning  a  1/ n  share in the license.  Our analysis 
suggests that the applicants would do better to form a cartel (that would win the 
lottery with certainty) and then allocate the franchise to one of their number via 
our bidding game; this is more efficient than the lottery, even if the winner is 
permitted to resell. A similar example is the Federal Aviation Administration's 
proposal  to  allocate  landing  slots  at busy  airports by  lottery. Again,  a more 
efficient approach is to assign the airlines shares in the slot equal to their weights 
in the proposed lottery, and let them play the bidding game we propose. 
As another application of the theory, consider the following buy-out provision 
of many two-member partnerships: one side submits a "buy-out" offer, and the 
other side then has the choice  of either buying or selling at these terms. Since 
this scheme  does  not guarantee ex-post  efficiency (the first player will  not, in 
general, submit his valuation, so the object will be inefficiently allocated if the 
other's valuation is between the first player's bid and valuation),  it too  can be 
improved upon by our bidding game. 
The  bidding  game  that  achieves  efficient,  individually-rational  dissolution 
differs from a typical auction in that every player pays or receives a sum of money 
that is a function of all the players' bids. Moreover, the set of bidders who pay 
a positive amount typically is not limited to the winning bidder, but includes the 
second and other high bidders as well. Since such bidding arrangements are not 
frequently observed, we  determine the circumstances in which more common 
auctions-such  as  first- and  second-price-can  achieve  efficient, individually- 
rational dissolution. This part of our analysis was inspired by Samuelson (1985), 
who describes a similar problem and solves a two-player example in which types 
are drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. He finds that split-the-difference 
bidding (the average of first- and second-price) yields an efficient allocation, but 
he ignores the individual rationality constraint that players should prefer partici- 
pation  in  the  game to  retaining their current share.  (He  imposes  instead the 
weaker constraint that players prefer participation to being dispossessed  of their 
current share.) We consider n players and arbitrary distributions and show that 
this and other similar auctions  may accomplish  efficient, individually-rational 
dissolution,  but only when partners' shares are very close to equal. 
Samuelson also provides an interesting interpretation of his work as an explor- 
ation of the Coase Theorem under incomplete information: instead of the com- 
plete-information conclusion that efficiency is always achieved and that property 
rights are immaterial, he shows that efficiency may be lost and property rights 
may matter. In these terms, our analysis shows  exactly when efficiency can be 
achieved and how property rights matter. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Sections 2 and 3, we analyze 
a revelation game to  determine the  set  of  partnerships that can be  dissolved 
efficiently.  Section  4  introduces  a  bidding  game,  that  accomplishes  efficient 
dissolution whenever it is possible, and Section 5 characterizes the set of partner- 
ships for which efficient dissolution is possible.  Section 6 shows that commonly 
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2.  THE  REVELATION  GAME 
Our model has n players indexed by i E N = {1, . . .,  n}. Player i owns a share 
ri of the good to be traded (ri  E [0, 1] and  n=, ri = 1) and has a valuation for the 
entire good  of  vi. Each player's valuation is known privately, but it is common 
knowledge that the valuations  are drawn independently  from a distribution F 
with support [p, v] and positive continuous density f 
We consider  the  direct revelation game  in  which  players simultaneously 
report their valuations  v = {v1, . . .,  vnI  and  then  receive  an  allocation  s(v) = 
{si(v),  . . .,  sn(v)}  and  t(v) = {t1(v)  . . . , tn(v)}, where si is the ownership share 
and ti is the net money transfer to player i. (Since this allocation is trader-specific, 
it may depend  on  the  vector  of  initial  ownership  rights,  r  =r,  . .  .{  , rn}.) We 
require that these allocations balance: E  si(v) = 1 and Zti(v) = 0 for all v E [P, v]f. 
The pair of outcome functions (s, t) is referred to as a trading mechanism. 
A player with valuation  vi, share ri, and money  mi has utility viri  + mi, which 
is linear in money and the asset. Also, we assume that each player is endowed 
with enough money, say vU,  that any required transfer is feasible. Because of the 
linear utility, only net transfers matter, so player i's utility before participating 
in the trading mechanism (s, t) can be  taken to  be  viri, while  afterwards it is 
visi  + ti. Let -i  = N\i  and let $-if  } be the expectation operator with respect to 
v_, Then we can define the expected share and money transfer for player i when 
he announces  vi by 
Si(vi)  =  F_i{si(v)}  and  Ti(vi)=  =_i{tj(v)}, 
so the player's expected payoff is 
Ui(vi)  =  visi(vi)  +  Ti(vi)- 
The mechanism (s, t) is incentive compatible if all types of all players want to 
report their private information truthfully: 
Ui(Vi) ?  ViSi(U) +Ti(U)  ViE  N,vi,  uE  [v,!v]. 
By the Revelation Principle  (Myerson (1979), among others), we lose no generality 
by restricting  attention to incentive-compatible mechanisms. The mechanism (s, t) 
is interim individually  rational if all types of all players are better off participating 
in the mechanism (in terms of their expected payoff) than holding their initial 
endowments: 
Ui(vi),rivi  V ie N  and  vie[v,i  ]. 
The following lemmas develop a necessary and sufficient condition for a mechan- 
ism to be incentive compatible  and individually rational. Since the proofs  are 
either simple or standard, they are relegated to the Appendix. 
LEMMA  1:  The trading mechanism (s, t) is incentive compatible  if and only iffor 
every i E N, Si is increasing and 
(IC)  T.(v)  -  Ti(vi)  =  u dSi(u) 
vf 
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Lemma 1 follows  from the fact that utility is linear in money and the asset. 
Linearity implies that Ui is convex and increasing in vi, with derivative Si almost 
everywhere. The continuity of  Ui implies that the net utility  Ui(vi) -  rivi has a 
minimum over vi E [y, v]. Lemma 2 identifies this worst-off type, and this allows 
us to restate individual rationality as a single condition in Lemma 3. 
LEMMA  2:  Given an incentive-compatible  mechanism (s, t) trader i's net utility 
is minimized at v* = 2 [inf ( V*) + sup ( V)]E  [v, v],  where 
V*={vi  I  Si(u) < ri V u < vi; Si(w) > ri V w > vi}. 
In the simplest case, Si is continuous and has ri in its range, so the valuation 
of  the worst-off type satisfies Si(v*) = ri; that is, the worst-off type  expects  to 
receive a share equal to his initial ownership right ri. Intuitively, the worst-off 
type  expects  on  average to  be  neither a buyer nor  a seller  of  the  asset,  and 
therefore he has no incentive to overstate or understate his valuation. Hence, he 
does not need to be compensated in order to induce him to report his valuation 
truthfully, which is why he is the worst-off type of trader. 
This in an interesting generalization of a similar result in Myerson and Sat- 
terthwaite (1983) for bilateral exchange (r = {O,  1}). In their paper, the lowest-type 
buyer (p)  and the highest-type seller (v)  are worst off; here the worst-off type 
typically is between v and vU,  since it is no longer clear who is selling and who 
is buying. 
LEMMA  3:  An incentive-compatible  mechanism (s, t)  is individually rational if 
and only iffor  all i E N 
(IR)  Ti(v*) ? O, 
where v* is defined in Lemma 2. 
Lemmas 1-3 lead to a necessary and sufficient condition for a trading mechan- 
ism to be incentive compatible and individually rational, stated in Lemma 4 below. 
LEMMA  4:  For any share function s such that Si is increasing  for all i E N, there 
exists a transfer  function t such that (s, t) is incentive compatible and individually 
rational  if and only if 
(I)  E[j  [1-  F(u)]u dSi(u)  -  F(u)u dSi(u)]  , 
i=l  V*  v 
where v* is defined in Lemma 2. 
The "only if"  part of the lemma follows  directly from the previous lemmas 
and the budget balance conditions E si(v) = 1 and  , ti(v) = 0, which every feasible 
mechanism must satisfy. The "if'  part of the lemma is proven by constructing a 
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the inequality (I) holds. The proof makes the following  intuition precise: there 
exists a transfer rule t that entices the worst-off type of each trader to participate 
in the mechanism, because (I) guarantees that the expected gains from trade are 
sufficient to bribe every trader to tell the truth. 
3.  EX  POST  EFFICIENCY 
The trading mechanism (s, t) is ex post efficient if for each vector of valuations 
v  the  outcome  of  the  mechanism  {s(v),  t(v)}  is  Pareto-undominated by  any 
alternative allocation,  ignoring incentive  constraints.3 Thus, ex  post  efficiency 
requires that the asset go to the trader with the highest valuation. A partnership 
(r, F)  can  be  dissolved efficiently if  there  exists  an  ex  post  efficient trading 
mechanism (s, t) that is incentive compatible and individually rational. Such a 
mechanism will be said to dissolve the partnership. For economy of expression, 
we will henceforth refer to ex post-efficient mechanisms that are incentive compat- 
ible and individually rational as efficient trading mechanisms.  A partnership that 
can be dissolved efficiently will be referred to as a dissolvable partnership. 
We  are now  prepared to  answer the  central question  of  this  paper:  What 
partnerships can be  dissolved  efficiently? At first glance,  one  might think that 
the set of dissolvable partnerships is empty; that is, the incomplete information 
about valuations necessarily leads to some inefficiency in trade. This is not the 
case. The following  theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition  for the 
existence of an efficient trading mechanism. 
THEOREM  1: A partnership  with ownership  rights r and valuations independently 
drawn  from F can be dissolved efficiently  if and only if 
(D)  E  J[1-F(u)]u  dG(u)-|  F(u)  udG  (u)]  0, 
il  V*  v 
where v*  F-F(ri1n-)  and G(vi)=  F(Vi)n-= 
PROOF: Ex post efficiency requires that the good go to the trader who values 
it the most: 
Si  (v  O0  if  vi < max  vj, 
I  if  vi = max vj. 
(In the event that two or more traders have the highest valuation, then the shares 
can be split arbitrarily among them. Since ties occur with zero probability, they 
will be ignored in what follows.)  By independence,  the expected share function 
Si is given by 
Si(vi) = Pr{vi  > max vj}  = F(vi)n-1  = G(vi). 
Thus,  v*  satisfies  F(v*)n-I  = ri, so  v  = F-1(r 1-).  Substituting into  (I)  of 
Lemma 4 yields  (D).  Q.E.D. 
3 Our definition  of  ex  post  efficiency corresponds to  classical  ex  post  efficiency as  defined  in 
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4.  AN  EFFICIENT  BIDDING  GAME 
In this section, we introduce a bidding game that serves the same purpose as 
an efficient trading mechanism. Using terminology analogous to that introduced 
in Section 3, given a dissolvable partnership, one could use an efficient trading 
mechanism or an efficient bidding game to dissolve it. This is a useful complement 
to  the  revelation-game  analysis  of  Section  2,  because  it  uses  strategy spaces 
familiar in practice, namely bids  rather than valuations.  In a general bidding 
game, the  n players submit sealed bids, the good  is transferred to the highest 
bidder, and each bidder i pays a total price Pi(b,, ...  I bn). In the efficient bidding 
game analyzed below, the total price Pi is the sum of a price 
pi(b1,...,  bn)=  bi -  1  E  b 
n-  joi 
and a side-payment  ci that can precede the bidding.  Note  that in the efficient 
bidding game the winning bidder pays a positive price pi, as usual, but so may 
the second and other high bidders. As in a standard auction, a higher bid buys 
the player a larger probability of winning. Here, however, making a higher bid 
is like buying more lottery tickets in that the purchase price of losing tickets is 
not refunded. 
THEOREM  2:  A bidding game with prices 
1 
(P)  pi(bj...,  bn)=  bi -  -  5  bj,  n -j1 
preceded by side-payments 
v*  1  n  v  * 
(C)  ci(r1,...,  rn)=  u dG(u)--  {-  udG(u), 
is an efficient bidding game:  it dissolves any dissolvable partnership. 
PROOF:  We solve for a strictly increasing symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. If 
the n -  1 others use the strategy b( *), then  i's expected utility from bidding bi 
with valuation vi is 
Ui(v.,  bi) =  {  [vi  -  bj  +  1 b(u)+'1  b(u)]  dG(u) 
+  [-bi+  b(u)+  b(u)1 dG(u), 
b-l(b,)  n-1I  n- 1 
where  b(u)=fJb(vj)dF(vjlu)  and  F(vjju)=F(vj)/F(u).  (Since  types  are 
independent, all but the highest of the n -  1 other bids generate the same expected 
value, conditional on the value of the highest bid; this is b(u).) The best response 
for i therefore solves 
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Since  aUi/abi  is  positive  (negative)  for  bi less  than  (greater than)  b(vi),  the 
second-order condition is satisfied. We are interested in the symmetric solution, 
which satisfies 
b(vi)  =  u dG(u)  + b(v). 
u=v 
Since  b'> 0,  this  equilibrium is  ex  post  efficient: the  trader with  the  highest 
valuation receives the good. The constant b(v)  is arbitrary (it equals the lowest 
amount, presumably zero, that the rules of the game allow a player with valuation 
v to bid), and disappears when pi and b are composed: 
(T)  pi[b(v1),...  b(v.)]-  u dG(u) +  1~  E  u dG(u).  v  ~  ~~n 
-  I  i5i  v 
Some simple algebra verifies that (T) and (C) define the transfer rule used in the 
"'if" part of the proof of Lemma 4, so individual rationality is guaranteed. 
Q.E.D. 
Since the side-payments depend on r = {rl, . . .,  rn}  (through v* =  {v*, ...,  v*}) 
and F, but not on v =  {v,  . . .,  vn  }, they can precede the bidding procedure. Their 
purpose is to compensate large shareholders, who are effectively dispossessed in 
the bidding game that follows,  since the prices pi are independent  of  r and so 
treat all  shareholders  alike.  Accordingly,  the  side-payments  are zero  for the 
equal-shares partnership (1/ n,  . ..,/  n). 
5.  CHARACTERIZATION  RESULTS 
We now offer four propositions that characterize the set of partnerships which 
can be dissolved efficiently. The proofs are not of interest in themselves, and so 
are given in the Appendix. First, we formalize the idea that it is large shareholders 
that make interim individual rationality difficult to achieve: for any distribution 
F, the equal-share partnership is dissolvable  but the partnership in which one 
player owns the entire asset is not. 
PROPOSITION  1:  The set  of partnerships that can be dissolved efficiently is a 
nonempty,  convex, symmetric  subset of the n -1  dimensional  simplex and is centered 
around the equal-shares  partnership ( 1/ n, . . . ,1 / n). 
PROPOSITION  2:  A  one-owner partnership {r, = 1, r2 =  O,  . . .,  rn  =  0}  cannot be 
dissolved efficiently. 
Proposition 2 generalizes to many buyers Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) 
result  that  a  buyer-seller  relationship  cannot  simultaneously  satisfy  ex  post 
efficiency and  interim individual  rationality. This  speaks to  the time-honored 
tradition of solving complex  allocation problems by resorting to lotteries: even 
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the  one-owner  partnership that  results  from the  lottery cannot  be  dissolved 
efficiently. 
These propositions  are derived by making the appropriate substitutions into 
(D) of Theorem 1. Note that each partner's  ownership share ri  enters the inequality 
through v,. 
As an example, if the traders' valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution 
on [0, 1], then (D)  simplifies to 
(D')  Er  n + 
Thus, for a uniform distribution, a partnership r can be dissolved  efficiently if 
and only if (D') is satisfied. By Proposition 1, (D') determines a convex, symmetric 
subset of the simplex,  shown  as the unshaded region in  Figure 1 for the case 
n = 3. Only partnerships in the extremities of the simplex cannot be dissolved 
efficiently.  For the  uniform  case,  as  the  number  of  partners (n)  grows,  the 
percentage of partnerships that are dissolvable  increases from 58% to 93% to 
99% as n increases from 2 to 4 to 6. Also,  the percentage share of the largest 
possible owner in a dissolvable partnership increases from 79% to 82% to 88% 
as n increases from 2 to 20 to 200. 
By contrast with Proposition 2, however, partnerships with an arbitrarily  small 
amount of distributed ownership may be dissolvable. (Note that the proof employs 
a very special distribution.) 
/(0,  .,  .)\ 
(.31.7,.300 
*(sX3X)  >,(1,0,0) 
F  1  (0p3pw7)  ( 
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PROPOSITION  3:  Any partnership  not owned by a single player can be dissolved 
efficiently  for some distributions  F 
Finally, if any partnership is replicated a sufficient number of times then it 
can be dissolved efficiently. Consider the partnership 
R(n I m) = {ri = 1/m,  i = 1, . . .,  m; r = O,  j = m + 1, . . .,  nm}. 
This partnership results from replicating the n-player, one-owner partnership m 
times-the  m  partners who  own  positive  shares  each  own  1/ m  of  the  total 
endowment of m goods, so partnerships continue to be represented by points in 
a  simplex.  The  m-fold  replication  of  any  other  n-player  partnership can  be 
represented in a similar way. 
PROPOSITION  4:  Given F and an n-player  partnership {r1, . . .,  r, },  there exists 
a finite M such that  for all m > M the m-fold replication  of the n-player  partnership 
can be dissolved efficiently. 
We think of this result as complementing the core-convergence theorems for 
exchange economies: replicating the economy sufficiently often reduces the effect 
of the incomplete information to zero. 
An interesting special case is R(2  m). For m = 1, Myerson and Satterthwaite's 
result  (and  our  Proposition  2  above)  proves  that the  partnership cannot  be 
dissolved efficiently. For larger values of  m, R is much like the double auction 
studied by Wilson  (1985)  and Gresik and Satterthwaite (1985)  although there 
each bidder wants only  one  unit of  the good,  whereas here each bidder may 
demand up to m units of the good. (Think of each 1/nm  share of the partnership 
as one  unit of  the good.)  When each bidder wants one  unit,  Gresik and Sat- 
terthwaite show that ex post efficiency is approached in the limit; more specifically, 
for the uniform case, they find that 99.31 per cent of the gains from trade are 
realized if there are six traders on each side of the market. When each bidder 
wants m units, on the other hand, ex post  efficiency is achieved  for the same 
example when there are as few as two traders on each side of the market. (To 
see this, check that (D') holds for R(212) for this example.) 
6.  SIMPLE  TRADING  RULES 
The efficient bidding game proposed in Theorem 2 dissolves  any dissolvable 
partnership. Although the efficient trading mechanism implicit in Lemma 4 and 
Theorem 1 achieves the same effect, we prefer the bidding game for two (somewhat 
imprecise) reasons. First, as mentioned above, it uses strategy spaces familiar in 
practice. And second, and probably more important, in the bidding game a great 
deal of the computational burden has been shifted from the mechanism designer 
to the players: the designer makes a simple  calculation  of  side-payments  and 
prices, using (C) and (P), while the players do most of the work in their calculation 
of the optimal bidding  strategy b(vi).  In the trading mechanism, on the other 
hand, the players simply report their valuations while the designer shoulders all 
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In this spirit, we find it disappointing that the side-payments given by (C) in 
Theorem 2 depend on the distribution F, for it seems plausible that the designer 
will know F less well than do the players. Ideally we would like a bidding game 
that can be  described  independently  of  F, so  that the  designer  could  always 
recommend it without assessing the distribution of the partners'  private valuations. 
Unfortunately, the Revelation Principle is no help here: it analyzes the composi- 
tion of the players' strategies and the designer's game rules, but gives no guidance 
as to how to decompose this map from types to outcomes into strategies for the 
players that may depend on F and game rules for the designer that are independent 
of F. 
We have not addressed the issue of finding the optimal bidding game or trading 
mechanism that is independent of F, in part because of the difficulty in formalizing 
this notion.  (Asking only  for independence  of  F, for instance,  is not  enough, 
because  the designer can ask the players to report F, and then implement the 
side-payments given by (C) if the reports agree, and forbid trade if the reports 
do  not agree.) Instead, we offer two speculative  approaches to bidding games 
that are independent of  F, in the hope that these ideas will be expanded upon. 
First, it may be possible  for the designer to use the players' bids to estimate 
F, and then to use this estimate to construct side-payments that relax the individual 
rationality constraints, like those in (C). This process seems both complex and 
delicate.4 
Second, some bidding games that are independent of F can dissolve a limited 
subset of the set of dissolvable partnerships. In particular, the game we discuss 
below dissolves the equal-shares partnership for any distribution F  In addition, 
this bidding game has three other virtues when compared to the efficient bidding 
game in Theorem 2. First, it is simple and familiar. Second, it is less vulnerable 
to collusion.  (In the efficient bidding game, a cartel saves the cost of all losing 
bids by submitting only one nonzero bid.) And third, it relies less heavily on the 
risk neutrality of the bidders, since only the winner is required to pay. 
Specifically, we consider a "k+  1-price auction" in which the players submit 
sealed bids and the good is transferred to the highest bidder, who pays each of 
the others 
p( bl,  b2,  -.. .,  bn )  =[kb,  +  (I  1-k)bf]  n 
4 More precisely, estimating F seems complex and using the estimate seems delicate. As an example, 
suppose  that F  is known to be approximately uniform on  [0, v] with  D  E [V, V]. Consider playing 
the bidding game of Theorem 2 without the side-payments. Then for every pair of players {ij},  use 
the  remaining n -2  players' bids  to  estimate  F,  as follows.  First, use  the  symmetric equilibrium 
bidding strategy identified in the text to map an arbitrary  distribution of valuations F into a distribution 
of bids. And second, vary F over the set of distributions described above in order to maximize some 
goodness-of-fit  criterion imposed  on  the  two  distributions  of  bids,  one  observed,  and the  other 
calculated. Now  use this estimate to calculate the side-payment cj(rl,..  ,  ) given in (C) and let i 
pay j  the amount cj/(n -1).  In this construction, the payments received by any one player depend 
only on the other players' bids, so the equilibrium strategies are unaffected. Therefore, the size of 
the subset of the set of dissolvable  partnerships that can be dissolved  in this way depends only on 
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where bf and b, are the first- and second-highest bids from {b,, b2,...,  bn}, and 
k E [0, 1]. For k = 0 this is like a first-price  auction, for k = l it is like a second-price 
auction, and for k = 2 it is the split-the-difference scheme described by Samuelson 
(1985). 
Note that the revenue from bidding (namely, the highest bidder's bid) is divided 
equally among  all the bidders. This is important. When the original ownership 
shares are unequal, the individual rationality constraints could  be more easily 
met by paying losing  bidders in proportion to  their shares, but then partners 
owning different shares would  have different equilibrium bidding  strategies so 
the partner with the highest valuation might not win, violating ex post efficiency.5 
We begin  by  calculating  an  equilibrium bidding  strategy for  this  auction. 
Calculating the  interim expected  utility associated  with this  equilibrium then 
determines the  set  of  partnerships that can  be  dissolved  efficiently using  the 
k +1-price  auction. (Again, the terminology is analogous to that introduced in 
Section 3.) 
PROPOSITION  5:  A  k +1-price  auction has  a  symmetric equilibrium bidding 
strategy given by 
fz=i-=F1(k)  [F(z)-k]n  dz 
[F(vi)-k]n 
PROPOSITION  6:  The set of partnerships  that can be dissolved efficiently  using a 
k+  1 price auction is a nonempty, convex, symmetric subset of the simplex and is 
centered around the equal-shares  partnership (1/n,  ...  , 1/n). 
Thus, an equal-shares partnership can always be dissolved  efficiently by any 
k +1-price  auction. Such a simple auction only works, however, when partners' 
shares are approximately equal, since the auction ignores the ownership rights r 
and this makes large shareholders unwilling to participate. For the uniform case, 
the  k +1-price  auction  dissolves  a  partnership if  and  only  if  (max r,)n/n-is 
1/(n -1),  which for n =2,  n = 20, and n = 200 is satisfied if no partner's share 
exceeds  57.7%,  5.54%  and  0.511%,  respectively.  (A  special  property of  the 
uniform distribution is that these results are independent  of  k. Contrast these 
results, however, with the corresponding results for the efficient bidding game, 
which are given after Proposition 2.) The intuition is that, because the auction 
treats all players as if they owned share 1/n,  large shareholders will participate 
only  if the  expected  gain from trade exceeds  the cost of  being,  in effect, dis- 
possessed.  As  n increases, the  expected  gain from trade of  the worst-off type 
decreases: a player with high share and high valuation becomes  almost certain 
to be just outbid by players with slightly higher valuations. Thus given a share 
p E [0, 1] there will exist some N,  such that a partner with share p will be willing 
to participate only if n -  Np, and in the limit, only shareholders with p < 1/n  are 
willing to participate. 
5We  could for every partner  j  divide j's  bid among the other (n -1)  players in proportion to the 
other's relative shares, since then incentives for the bidders are unaffected by their relative shares. 
This is an example of the type of  auction discussed  in the previous footnote  and would typically 
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PROPOSITION  7:  As n ->  oo, the only partnership  that can be dissolved efficiently 
by a  k + 1  -price auction is the equal-shares partnership (1/ n, . . .,  1/ n).  That is, 
letting Pn be the largest share in a n-player  partnership that any partner can have 
such  that  the partnership  can  be dissolved  efficiently,  pn / (1/ n) --  1 as  n -*  x0. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
A  simple  extension  of  Myerson  and  Satterthwaite (1983)  shows  that with 
incomplete information no mechanism can guarantee that an object to be traded 
will be allocated to the person who values it most, if the object is initially owned 
by a single party. In contrast, we show that if the ownership is distributed among 
a partnership, ex-post  efficient allocation  is often possible.  Further, when it is 
possible, it can be achieved by a simple bidding game. In a more general model 
of  partnerships,  our  observation  that  the  range  of  partnerships that  can  be 
dissolved  efficiently is centered around equal shares suggests that this might be 
a factor influencing the way in which partnerships are formed. 
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix supplies the proofs of Lemmas 1-4 and Propositions 1-7. 
LEMMA  1:  The trading mechanism (s, t) is incentive compatible if and only iffor  every i E N, S, is 
increasing and 
(IC)  T,(v*)-T,(v)  =  u dSf(u) 
for all v, v* E [P, 5]. 
PROOF: Only If  If (s, t) is incentive compatible, then  U(v,)  = v,Si(v,)+  Ti(v,)-  v,S,(u)+  T7(u), 
or equivalently 
U,  (v,)  --  U,  (U)  +(v  -  U)S,  (U), 
implying that U, has a supporting hyperplane at u with slope Si(u)  v 0. Thus, U, is convex and has 
derivative dUildvi  = S, almost everywhere. Also,  S, must be increasing, and 
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(We use the Stieltjes integral throughout this paper, so that any discontinuities in the expected share 
function are accounted for in the integral.) By integration by parts, 
J S  S(u)  du  = v,Si(v,)  - vSi(v)-  u dS,(u), 
which together with the definition of  U, yields (IC). 
If. Adding the identity 
vi  Si (vi)  -  Si (r*)  I =  viJ  dSi (u) 
to (IC) results in 
vj[S,(v,)-S,(v*)]+  Ti(v,)-  T,(v*)  =  (vi  -  u) dSi(u)  O, 
V* 
where the inequality follows  because  the integrand is nonnegative  for all  VI, u E [p, v],  since  S, is 
increasing. Rearranging the terms on the left-hand side yields 
v,Si(v,) + Ti(vi)  viSi(vP) + T,(v,), 
which is incentive compatibility.  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  2:  Given an  incentive-compatible  mechanism (s, t),  trader i's  net utility is minimized at 
v>*  1[inf ( V*) + sup ( V*)] E [p, v],  where 
V*  =  {v,  I S,(u)  <  ri V  u  <  vi;  Si(w)  >  ri V  w>  v}. 
PROOF: The net utility to trader i with valuation vi is Ui(vi) -  rvi, which is convex in vi by Lemma 
1. Therefore, trader i's net utility is minimized at the point where the left and right derivatives of  U, 
with respect to v, bound ri. But dUJldv, = S, almost everywhere, S, is increasing, and Ti is decreasing 
in vi. Four cases need to be considered. First, suppose that S,(u) > ri or Si(u) < r, for all u E [p, v5]; 
then the minimum occurs at the boundaries v* = v or vi  = D,  respectively. The next three cases deal 
with the  case  where there exists  u  and  w such  that  S,(u)>  r, and  Si(w) <  r,. (1)  Suppose  Si  is 
continuous and strictly increasing; then there exists a unique vi  such that Si(v0) = r,, which minimizes 
trader i's net utility. (2) If Si is not continuous and S, jumps past ri, then the vi at which S, jumps 
minimizes net utility. (3) Finally, if Si(u) = ri over an interval, then each type in the interval is equally 
worse off and we can arbitrarily select any valuation in the interval to be the worst-off type. 
Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 3:  An incentive-compatible  mechanism (s, t) is individually  rational if and only iffor all i E N 
(IR)  Ti  (Vi)  ?O 
where vi  is defined in Lemma 2. 
PROOF: We need only check individual rationality at the valuation v* defined in Lemma 2. Thus, 
the  individual-rationality  constraint  becomes  vSi(v,*)+  Ti(v,)  ?  rv*, or riv*+ Ti(vi*)  r,v,*. 
Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  4:  For any share function s such that S, is increasing  for  all i E N,  there exists a transfer 
function t such that (s, t) is incentive compatible  and individually rational if and only if 
(I)  S1 [J  ~[1-F(u)]  u dS, (u) -  F(u) u dSi (U)  :-:  0, 
where v* is defined in Lemma 2. 




T,  (VI)  =  T,  I^* 
_. 
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Integrating over all types in [p, v] yields 
wi  I  T(vM) = Ti(v)-{  u  dS(d(u) dF(v,) 
=  1(vP)-  [FJ  dF(vj)+u  dS,(u)+  dS  dF(vi)udS,(u) 
uv*  v,uuv  ,= 
Rv  ~~~~~~~v* 
= T,(v*)-  [1F(u)]  u dS,  (u) +  F(u) u dS,  (u), 
where the  second  line  follows  from changing  the  order of  integration.  Budget balance  requires 
Ei=I ti(v) =  0 for all v, so we have 
n  n 
Y_  Wi{T'(v')1=  N  Y t,(V)  =0. 
i=l  i=l 
Therefore, summing over all traders yields 
iE1  7i(v*') ,= 1[I  -  F(u)]u  dSi(u))  F(u)u  dSi(u). 
From Lemma 3,  T7(v*) must be nonnegative for all i, which implies Y-  T.0(v*)O.  If  The proof is by construction. Let 
rvI  I  Vi 
t(v)=  ci - J  udS,(u) +  Z  u dSj(u), 
where  I ti(v)=  0 implies  _  c, =0.  Then, after changing the order of integration, 
T,  (vi) = ci-  u dS, (u) +  Y  }  [1- F(u)]u  dSj(u), 
so Lemma 1 guarantees that (s, t) is incentive compatible. Finally, by Lemma 3, we have individual 
rationality if and only if T,(v0) ?  0. A little algebra shows the hypothesis of Lemma 4 to be equivalent 
to the condition  ,=I  Ti(v*) a 0, so we can choose 
ci =  E  Ti  (vP)  +  u dSi (u)-  1 -  [1F(u)]u  dSj  (u),  n i=1  n -  lsi 
which results in  Ti(vO)=(l/n)Z'  1_  T(v*)?n0.  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  1:  The set  of partnerships that can be dissolved efficiently is a  nonempty, convex, 
symmetric  subset of the n -  1  -dimensional simplex and is centered around the equal shares partnership 
(1/n,...,  l/n). 
PROOF:  Use  (D)  to define  f: Y'n-.> R  by 
4(r)=  v  f(v1)F(v  )n-2 dv -|  v f(v,)F(vi)n-1 dv,] 
Convexity follows  from concavity of  f, which we have because 
ad  -v*dF(v*)  n-l  dv*~  _v* 
ar,  n  n-I  dr,  n-i1 
a24  a24  1  dv*' 
=0,  and  2-  ' -  <0. 
dra  ar,  dr,  n-I  dr, 
Symmetry follows  from relabeling the partners. Finally,  (1/n,...,  1/n))>0  because  at v*(l/n)= 
F-'(lnll"'1-)  we have 
v,f(v,)F(v,) 
n-2  dv, -  vf(v,)F(vi)  n-1  dv, 
v*  Y~~~~V 
D  1  t*(  0  nF(v  )''-1  (n  1)  F(v,)" DISSOLVING  A  PARTNERSHIP  629 
where  the  equality  arises  after  integrating  each  term  by  parts,  and  the  inequality  holds  since 
nF"-l  -  (n - 1)F" 
n  1 for all v, E [v*, v], so the first term dominates the third.  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 2:  A one-owner  partnership  {rl =  1, r2  =  0,...,rn  =  O} cannot be dissolved efficiently. 
PROOF:  For the n-player partnership {r, = 1, r2  = 0, ...,  rn  = O},  integrating by parts in (D) yields 
F"?  dv+J  F ndv:O, 
which fails for all finite n.  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  3:  Any partnership  not owned by a single player can be dissolved efficiently  for some 
distributions  F 
PROOF:  The proof is by construction, using the distribution F(u)  =  {1 -  [u(v)]-'}/{1  -  T-'}  where 
a e(0,2)  and u(v)=  1+{(T-1)(v-v)/(v-v)}  (so u(p)=  land  u(v)=  T).Takeanarbitrarypartner- 
ship {r I  r, <1  V i} and let d = 1 -  T-'.  Using a binomial expansion for Fn-2  and Fl-1  and performing 
the integration indicated in (D)  yields 
=  d~~'  -(n  -2)  iTh  I  u=(v(r) 
+  )={Ed  n-l  I  l-e a  1-2ao  u(*  t) 
d 
n 
I  I-a  1-2a  ]  "= 1  (T-1 
It suffices to show that the above terms in  T in the braces tend to +00  with T, because the terms in 
T ignored are of lower order, and so are insignificant, and all the terms in the lower limits are finite 
because u(v*(ri))  approaches a finite limit, V r, < 1. (It is crucial that we have ri < 1, since u(v*(1))  =T, 
which does not stay finite as T->  e  o.) To show that the terms in T approach 00, replace T by (1 -  d) 
and collect terms. This yields 
dn  )2-d  lI-2  -  I  n  +  )3-1/a  dll-l 
(I  L  1-2a  d(I-a)  J  d(I1-2a)  / 
As  T ->  oo,  d -> 1. Therefore, the second  term above can be ignored, since it has an extra factor of 
(1 - d).  Since a E (0, 2), 2 - 1/ a < 0,  so the first term goes to 00  as d -> 1 provided 
1  1 
>  >O 
1-2a  d(I-a)  > 
which holds for d E ((1 - 2a)/  (1 -  a),  1). So 0 (r) > 0  for sufficiently large T  Q.  E.  D. 
PROPOSITION 4:  Given F and an n-player  partnership  {r,,  . . .,  rn}, there exists a finite M such that 
for all m > M the m-fold replication  of the n-player  partnership  can be dissolved efficiently. 
PROOF:  By the concavity of  f established in  Proposition  1, it suffices to show  that the result 
holds  for the  n-player  partnership {r, =  1, r2  =  0,.,rn  =  0},  the  m-fold  replication  of  which  is 
{r,  = 1/rm,  i = 1.  n,  m; rj  = 0,j  = m + 1.  n,  mn}. Let mn = N. Then m = N/n  and the partnership of 
interest is {r, = n/ N,  i = 1-.  , N/n;  r, =  ,j = (N/n)  + I..,  N}.  After integrating by parts in (D) 
and collecting terms, we have 
I+R  0v,  _  NFN-  - (N-  I)F)  =  ~~~~~~~~du] 
N  N(N-1)  v,  N(N(-)1) 
[isFN1 JV  (NFN-(N  1  N  u 
n  v  N-1  v  N(N  -1) 
where v* = v*(n/N)  =  F-l[(n/N)l/N-l].  Since  NFN-1  -(N-1)FN  <1  over [vi,  v], the first pair 
of terms is strictly positive. The second pair is positive for sufficiently large N  if 
(N-1)v  F  Ndu 
lim  >1  --. 
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Consider two arbitrary values  k, < k2 from (p, v), and let K, = F(ki)  for i = 1, 2. As N -* oo,  v*' > v3, 
so  for  sufficiently  large  N  we  have  k, <1k2  <v*.  Let  I =  k2FN  du  and  J =fvF  EN  du.  Then 
k2F  N-i  du  < I/K1 and fvk  FN-i  du  <J/K2<J/K1  So  2 
fv  F  du  J  "  FNdu+fvk  F  du 
vl  FN-i  du  (k1 -v)K  ' 2+FJ EN-i  du+fv*  FNl  du 
I+J 
> K1(k)K. 
Since I+J>J>(v*-k2)Kj,  we have 
I+J  (v*-k2)K  N 
(k,  -V)KN+  I  +J  l(k,-  )K 
N 
+  (v*-k2)K  N  K1~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
v1-k2 
-  k1  (k-)(K/K2)N  (*k2) 
Fix e>0,  and let K1=I-  y,  and K2=-I-e.  Then (K,/K2)N_*O  while v* -k2-vk2,  so the last 
ratio above approaches 1 -'e,  and can therefore be made to exceed 1  -  (I/n)  for fixed n, as required. 
Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  5:  A k + 1 -price auction has a symmetric equilibrium  bidding strategy given by 
b  Ji  =v 
z=F'  (k)  [E(z)  -  k]  dz 
[F(v,)-k]n 
PROOF:  Let G(x)  =  F(x)'n-.  If i conjectures that the n-I  others will use the strategy b(v3), then 
i's expected utility from bidding bi with valuation v, is 
U (v,  b,  = X  (  -  [kb(x)  +(1  -  k)b])  dG(x) 
1 
V  b-l(b,)  I 
+  I  b  (b  -[kb.  + (1 -  k)b(x)]  dH(y I  x) dG(x) 
+I  -[kb(y)  + (  - k)b(x)]  dH(y I  x) dG(x), 
xb  l(b,)  y=b  (,)  n 
where  H(y l  x) =  [F(y)/  F(x)]  n-2  (for y -  x)  is the  distribution of  the second-largest  of the  n-I 
other bids given that the largest is x. The best response for i therefore solves 
a  U  dbF'  n - I  I  n2  = (vi -  b,)g[b`(bi)]  -  F[b-  (bi)]2(F[b-'(b)]  -  k) =  0. 
a,b  dbi  n 
The symmetric equilibrium b(v,)  satisfies 
v,-b(v,)  =-b'(vi)  ( 
- k 
n  f(v,) 
This linear differential equation can be solved using the integrating factor [F(vi)  -  k]"; the solution 
is a one-parameter family satisfying 
[v  -  b(vi)][F(v,)  -k  =  jn  [F(u)  -  k]" du. 
We choose  c to make the right-hand side equal to zero at v, = F-'(k);  otherwise, bids tend to ?00 
as v, approaches F`(k)  from above or below. This choice of c yields the symmetric equilibrium 
J  =F-  (k)[F(z)  -  k]" dz 
bv,)  = v,---  [F(vi)-k]y 
and truth-telling occurs at v, =  F`(k).  Finally, since b'> 0, this equilibrium is ex-post efficient: the 
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It  remains,  then,  to  verify  interim  individual  rationality.  That  is,  we  want  w-(v,,  r,)= 
U[v,, b(v,)]-riviO  for all v, E [P, v],  where U[v,, b(v,)]  is 
fv  (  v,-  [kb(x)+(1-k)b(v,)])  dG(x) 
n 
+  -  +  [kb(vi)  +  ([  -  k)b(x)]  dH(y I  x) dG(x) 
JxV,  Jlv  n 
+  I [kb(y)  + (I - k)b(x)]  dH(y I  x) dG(x). 
xvI  yv,n 
Partially differentiating with respect to vf and applying the first-order  condition shows that, for fixed 
ri,  OF  is minimized at v*(r,)  = G-1(r).  Let w(r,) =  w[v*(r,), ri]; then 
n  -w(ri)  (x  -Gk)  |  b(x)dG(x)-r,b(v*) 
+k  F(b  s  )tn-2[ju-iF(v*)]b(vx)  -  b(x)  dG(x) 
+  b  b(y) dH (y|Ix) dG(x)).  Q.E.QD. 
n -1  x=D  y= 
PROPOSITION 6:  The set of partnerships  that can be dissolved efficiently  using a k + 1  -price auction 
is a nonempty,  convex, symmetric  subset of the simplex  and is centered  around the equal-shares  partnership 
(11n,. ..,  lln). 
PROOF:  Convexity follows from the concavity of w(rt), which holds because w'(r,) = -v*(ri)  and 
wr(rn) l  f/dral  (ri) <  a  since  wt  =  F-s1h(rel(  n  -)).  Symmetry follows  from relabeling the partners. 
[t  I  I\ 
Finally consider the equal-shares partnership in two steps. First, consider the terms involving I -  k. 
We have 
|b(x)  dG(x) ?- rlb(v**  ) 
at v* = G-1(11n)  by substituting b(v*) for b(x) in the integral and simplifying. And second, consider 
dI  )=j3II11 
the terms involving k. We have 
F(V*)  n  I-  [1F(*)  ]  b(v*):_:  b(x) dG(x)  -  J  b  (y) dH  (y Ix) dG  (x) 
D  ~  ~~~~  n-1  V* .V=* 
at v* = G-'(11n),  again by substituting b(v*) for b(x) and b(y) in the integrals and simplifying. 
Q.E.  D. 
PROPOSITION  7:  AS  n  e> oo, the only  partnership  that can be dissolved  effiiciently  by a k  + Il-price 
auction  is the  equal-shares  partnership  (l/ n, . . . , l/ n). Th1at  is, letting  Pn be the  largest  share  in  a n-player 
partnership  that  any  partner  can have  such  that  the  partnership  can  be dissolved  efficiently,  Pnl  ( 1/ n  ) e> I 
as n ->OC. 
PROOF: It suffices to show that given 5 > O,  there exists N such that for all n > N, interim individual 
rationality fails for a player with share (I1  + 5)/ n. Let 
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Interim individual rationality for a player with share (1 + 8)/n  and valuation v((1 +  8)/(1  + 8) implies 
[(1?+  )]  )J  ]  (probability of losing)(value  of losing) 
+ (probability of winning)(value  of winning) 
<  (1)(-)  + (d-)(. 
Thus, 
(1 ?48)  < 1 + nd'll, 
which is necessarily false for all sufficiently large n.  Q.E.D. 
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ERRATUM 
IN  THE ARTICLE by P. Cramton, R. Gibbons, and P. Klemperer, "Dissolving a Partnership 
Efficiently,"  Econometrica, 55  (1987),  615-632,  there is  an  error in  the  statement  of 
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 (page 618). The difficulty is that the proof of Lemma 3 assumes 
that the worst-off type  vi* satisfies Si  V,*  ) = ri. The following additional assumption is 
sufficient  to  guarantee that  Si  (vi*) =  ri: assume  that  Si  has  range [0,1].  The  error is 
isolated to these two lemmas, since the remainder of the paper considers ex post efficient 
sharing rules, which satisfy this full-range assumption. The authors are grateful to Preston 
McAfee for drawing attention to the error. 
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